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Methodology of the Study 
 
This study was conducted by an urgent anthropology team made up of an expert in 
Balkan history, a historian-anthropologist, a linguist-anthropologist, and a journalist 
specialized in Balkan affairs.1 This is the usual format of teams conducting urgent 
anthropology studies in the Western Balkans. 
The fieldwork was carried out on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina from May 3 
to 9, 2004, and included dozens of interviews in Sarajevo, Pale, Maglaj, Zenica, 
Visoko, Kakanj, and other smaller population centres. The history of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and, more specifically, the Bosnian situation immediately before and 
during the Ottoman period, has been one of the team leader’s research interests for 
years. The field researchers also had previous experience of this type of fieldwork, 
having conducted a series of interviews across Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1998. 
The purpose of the study was to establish the state of interethnic relations in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina almost nine years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. Also, 
to corroborate or reject the preliminary hypotheses that there is a revival of Islam as 
well as infiltration by non-traditional strands of Islam, such as the Wahhabiyah and 
Ahmadiyah. One of the top priorities of the researchers was to establish the levels of 
normalization of the administrative, economic, social, and cultural life in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. As in all studies conducted by the urgent anthropology method, the 
researchers aimed to produce an analysis of the present situation and shorter-term 
forecasts of developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina based on a snapshot of society, 
institutions, and the achievements and failures of the European presence in the country, 
as well as on the life histories of randomly selected respondents. 
Individual or group interviews were conducted with more than 50 randomly selected 
respondents from different social groups: urban residents, rural residents, intellectuals, 
military and police officers from SFOR. The respondents included people from all 
ethnic and religious communities in the Federation and in Republika Srpska, as well as 
their religious leaders. 
 
 
 
The War of Architecture 
 
One of the most striking observations of our team as we travelled around Novi Pazar 
and Sandzak and entered Bosnia was the feverish construction activity in two spheres: 
On the one hand, just like everywhere else on the Balkans, the nouveaux riches are 
building houses designed with dubious taste, in which they are investing their illegal 
earnings from marauding and profiteering during the wars, from the grey economy, and 
from people and drug trafficking. 
                                                 
1 Antonina Zhelyazkova, Valeri Grigorov, Donka Dimitrova, and Tanya Mangalakova. 
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Or, as we established in Bosnia, one of the most frequently cited issues concerns the 
feverish search for European donators who grant funds for building new homes to 
anyone who can prove that his or her house was destroyed during the war. Almost 80% 
of the housing stock in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been renovated, and new houses 
are seldom built over the foundations of old ones. In most cases this is the more 
economical variant, since there is a very real danger that unexploded shells or 
landmines might lie hidden in the ruins. That is why thickly overgrown ruins or bullet- 
and shell-pocked old buildings are an invariable feature of the landscape. Often the new 
houses are situated on the other side of the road and form something like a new 
settlement. The windows face the ravages of war across the road. The new houses are 
built immodestly, they are much bigger than the old ones, and have two, three or even 
four floors. Some of them are yet to be plastered and painted on the outside, but all are 
fitted with PVC or aluminum windows and doors. The biggest houses are usually the 
most kitschy ones – they are decorated with ponies, ducks, lions, dogs and other plaster 
or stone figures, and many of them also have replicas of ancient Greek columns and 
statues. 
It is obvious that there is a desire to develop an entirely new architectural concept in 
Bosnia. The new houses commonly have elaborate facades, conched entrance halls, and 
omnipresent elements such as colonnades and sculptures decorating the portals, garden 
walls and terraces. The yards and gardens are clean and well-tended, with mown grass. 
The contrast between the old and the new houses is so striking that the gloomy 
comments of the respondents who do not have new homes seem justified. They 
confirmed the rumours that some people had deliberately set their houses on fire in 
order to apply to donors for their reconstruction, but with a brand new design. 
We note this as a possible cause of future hostility: owners of poor old houses versus 
owners of new rich houses. 
On the other hand – and this was more important for our study – there is intensive 
construction of places of worship, religious schools and boarding schools, as well as 
other religious sites. This hyperactive religious construction has obviously become a 
compensatory mechanism designed to fill the void left by the end of fighting and the 
enforcement of a still uncustomary peace, despite the tensions of unallayed hostility 
that can be felt in the air. As an elderly respondent told us bitterly, “We hate each other 
very much, but we live in a kind of tolerant hostility.” 
Hostility has found a new vent and has a new face, and this face is architectural. 
Both religious communities, Muslims and Christians, are engaged in large-scale 
construction. Hundreds of mosques, churches, turbehs, chapels, and monasteries, some 
of which are of high cultural and historical value, have been restored or built all over 
the country. 
We will start our description from the district of Sandzak in Serbia, because our 
respondents convinced us that a Christian wall was being built here entirely 
deliberately to counter the just as material Islamic arc in this geographical area. Our 
subsequent observations verified what we initially assumed to be exalted claims by 
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rival members of the religious communities. Moreover, the religious, cultural, and 
political influence of Bosnia is entirely visible in this part of Serbia. Bosnian language, 
along with Arabic and English, has been introduced as a subject in the curriculum of all 
medreses, as well as in the Islamic Academy. Although our respondents in Sandzak 
frequently told us that “this is a Turkish cultural zone,” in fact there is no Turkish 
influence, the Ottoman cultural heritage is being replaced, and the presence of Bosnia is 
tangible. The ideological continuity between Bosnia and Sandzak is unquestionable. 
In Novi Pazar, Serbia, two new mosques have been built in recent years, bringing the 
total number of mosques in the town to 27. There are five Christian churches, but there 
are also several monasteries in the vicinity. The Sopocani Monastery (13th century), 
which is about 20 km from Novi Pazar, has been restored very recently. It used to be a 
convent, but the nuns have been sent to Kosovo and replaced by monks. According to 
local rumours, the hegumen of the monastery is a war criminal from the Bosnian war. 
The monks are ultra-radical Orthodox fanatics. Part of them have come from Kosovo. 
The rebuilt Djurdjevi Stubovi Monastery (12th century) is also several kilometres away 
from Novi Pazar. One of our respondents, a female Muslim journalist, said that it had 
been virtually in ruins, with nothing left of it except the foundations, but that in the last 
two or three years the monastery had been rebuilt completely and filled with monks 
from Kosovo. The oldest church in Novi Pazar is called Petrova Crkva (11th century) 
and has likewise been fully restored. Our respondent’s comment was laconic: “The 
Serb Church is building an Orthodox wall in Sandzak in order to fence itself off from 
the Islamic arc that is descending from Kosovo and Bosnia.” 
This comment sparked an argument between us, because the truth is that Novi Pazar, as 
well as some of the nearby villages, has been almost depopulated of Serbs. And while 
around the mosques and medreses there are crowds of young people, among whom 
Mujahideen-style beards and full body covering are in fashion, the area around the 
churches is almost deserted. The ethnic picture has changed in the past few years. At 
present, 81% of Novi Pazar’s population are Muslims who identify themselves as 
Bosniaks. Serb respondents claim that their own number is constantly decreasing 
because of the continuing tendency for Serb families to live in cultural discomfort and 
to migrate towards Central Serbia or to the nearby towns of Kragujevac and Kralevo: 
“We don’t trust our neighbours and we live in insecurity”; or “There is a jihad against 
us all. They traffick drugs, buy and sell weapons and women, while we try to survive in 
poverty”; or “We’ve broken off all contacts in the last 10 or 12 years since the war in 
Bosnia. We say hello to each other, but we have no other contacts.” 
Sjenica has a Muslim majority, and just 17% of its population fall in the category of 
“others.” In the nearby town of Tutin the Muslims are 98%. 
Bosnian scholars slant population statistics, presenting Muslims as the leading ethnic 
community even in towns where they are a minority. For example: “Priboj, 36,000 
population: 12,000 Bosniaks (33%) and 24,000 others (69%)”; or “Nova Varos, 23,000 
population: 2,000 Bosniaks (9%) and 21,000 others (91%).” No effort is made to 
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specify at least who those “others” in this inverted statistics are, even though they 
constitute 91% of the town’s population. 
The architectural and religious divide in Novi Pazar is entirely visible. The Serbs live in 
the northern part, which is new, with more modern architecture, and where the natural 
centre is the Sveti Nikola Church. At night this part of town is quite busy, with cafés, 
restaurants and discos full of young men and women. It looks like a busy quarter in any 
European provincial town. 
In the southern part of Novi Pazar life is organized around the old centre, the 
headquarters of the Islamic community and the two medreses. It looks like a typical 
Oriental quarter, with narrow and steep streets, a bridge over the river, and many 
goldsmith’s shops, bazaars, and little shops selling Islamic literature and all kinds of 
religious attributes. The southern part of town, which during the day is full of milling 
crowds – in the bazaars, shops, and cafés in which women never set foot – is virtually 
deserted at night. As we were told by a veiled young female respondent who is a 
student at the Islamic Academy, “We are all trying to observe the rules and to live 
according to the Shariah.” 
We asked several young men in one of the cafés why Novi Pazar was full of bearded 
men. They told us they were Bosniaks and asked us whether we were Christian or 
Muslim. Then they decided that we were not to be trusted and answered our questions 
frivolously: “The bearded men are artists, that’s why they have beards.” “But aren’t 
they a bit too many to be artists, all of them?” we retorted. Answer: “You can safely 
write down that you’ve been in the Town of Artists.” 
On our way to Bosnia we observed and took photos of the renovated grave monuments 
both on the outskirts of Novi Pazar and in the villages near Sjenica. The new 
architectural ideal in Sandzak is grave monuments from white marble shaped as thin 
miniature minarets. Since the monuments commemorate people who died between 
1970 and 2003 yet appear to be more or less the same and new, we concluded that this 
is a new fashion and that the monuments have been renovated recently just like many 
of the mosques. It is obvious that the old grave monuments in Ottoman style – modest 
tapering stones or stone slabs with the respective turbans – are no longer considered 
sufficient as an expression of strong commitment to Islam. People obviously need 
symbols that will demonstrate clearly and unambiguously the religious identity of the 
population centre, family, and person, even though he or she is dead. 
Incidentally, we must admit that in Dervent, Bosnia, we saw a large Christian cemetery. 
These were ordinary, sad graves of normal size – with three-metre-high crosses 
towering over some of them. 
On the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina architectural rivalry has acquired almost 
dramatic (it is impossible to refer to anything in that country as comic), grotesque 
proportions. As a respondent told us very sadly, “There’s no question that it’s only 
churches and mosques that are being built here. No one’s building factories.” 
Fortunately, the most important old Muslim architectural masterpieces in Sarajevo have 
been preserved. The warring sides agreed at the very beginning of the siege that they 
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would not target mosques and churches. In the rest of the country, however, there was 
large-scale destruction. According to one of our respondents, a religious leader, about 
1,000 mosques were destroyed during the war. The number of Orthodox and Catholic 
churches destroyed in the war is smaller but likewise impressive. More than half of the 
mosques and many of the churches have already been restored, and the others are in the 
process of restoration. 
In addition to the restored old mosques, there are about 150 newly built ones. The 
places of worship from the golden age of Ottoman architecture (16th-17th century) are 
eclipsed by mosques in Arab classical or modernistic style, financed by the King of 
Jordan through Queen Rania’s foundation or by Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, 
whose mosque in Tuzla is so opulent that it is known as the “Golden Mosque”; there 
are also mosques in the specific Maghrebi style, financed by Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. 
This geographical-architectural eclecticism is compounded by mosques in Indonesian 
style, financed by the government of Indonesia. 
We asked a leader of the Muslim community whether he thought that the financial 
support for religious construction coming from countries from the Near and Middle 
East and the Maghreb wasn’t a bit too much. His answer: “We mostly restore mosques, 
because the Islamic community in Bosnia and Herzegovina doesn’t have the resources 
to build new ones. We are grateful to the donors who build beautiful mosques. The 
European Union hasn’t built us a single mosque. Back in the past on the Balkans, when 
we had a sultan in Istanbul, we knew who was to blame for our problems. Now the 
sultan is in Brussels but, by the way, we don’t know his name. We only presume that it 
might be Prodi or Solana. Back in the past on the Balkans we knew the name of the 
sultan and could speak out, criticize, but now we don’t know who our sultan is. If Mr 
Prodi or Mr Solana wish to build a mosque in Bosnia, we will accept this with gratitude 
and name the mosque after them. That’s better than them being upset because we’re 
building mosques with Saudi money. When Europe gives us money we’ll call them 
European mosques. We aren’t fanatics so we won’t accept one donation but refuse 
another. Let Europe give us money to renovate the mosques and we’ll tell the Saudis, 
‘Thanks, but now you should help others because Europe is protecting and defending 
us and building us mosques’.” 
We tried to argue with him: “But the EU countries gave money for reconstruction of 
the houses destroyed during the war, didn’t they? All those new houses on the territory 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina are a fact thanks to the donations from the EU and the 
USA. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the other Muslim countries finance 
construction of mosques and medreses only.” The Muslim leader answered as follows: 
“The Saudis granted funds for the reconstruction of 1,000 houses in Brcko, for 
renovation of the railways in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Today Saudi Arabia is ready to 
give us more than the government is willing to accept because the institutions are afraid 
that the EU and USA will label it a terrorist money.” Question: “You are obviously 
accusing the EU countries of a one-sided approach or bias?” Answer: “There’s a 
problem and that’s obvious. Germany granted 200,000 former Marcs for the restoration 
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of the Orthodox monastery in Mostar but hasn’t granted funds for the renovation of a 
single mosque even though it knows that mostly mosques were destroyed in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Sweden is the only European country that helped us renovate the mosque 
in Maglaj.” 
Albeit on a more modest scale (due to the lack of such generous foreign aid), intensive 
construction of churches and monasteries is likewise under way. One architectural 
feature that is extremely interesting is the abandonment of the classical style of 
Orthodox church belfries and the assertion of a brand new style that is foreign to the 
Orthodox tradition and that symbolizes the rivalry between the religious communities. 
The new belfries tower over the landscape, rising at a huge height similar to the 
minarets. They may be as many as 40 or 50 metres high and, when viewed from a 
distance, are very difficult to tell apart from the minarets unless you see the gilt or 
silvered crosses that crown them. 
In every town or village in Bosnia and Herzegovina the rivalry between mosques and 
churches starts from their number, which is aimed to represent approximately the ratio 
between the Muslim and Christian communities in the respective town or village. In the 
town of Bijeljina, one half of the 34,000 pre-war population was Muslim, and the other 
half was Serb and Croat. After the war the population increased to 50,000, of which 
just 10% are Muslims.2 Some 11,000 Muslims have settled in the town closest to 
Bjeljina, Janja, which they keep ethnically clean. Bijeljina is a typical example of a 
town affected by postwar ethnic cleansing and population exchange. It used to have 
five mosques and two Orthodox churches. At present the four mosques destroyed 
during the war are being rapidly rebuilt, whereas the Serbs have already built six 
churches. 
The new monastery complex named after St Vasilije Ostroski in Bijeljina is a classical 
example of the new architecture which we will tentatively call religious architecture of 
superiority. It is also the seat of the Orthodox eparchy. Hidden behind high walls, the 
new complex encompasses two old buildings which have been renovated and serve as 
the headquarters of the bishop. They were restituted to the Serb Orthodox Church. 
Several new buildings were built on the restituted land between 1996 and 2001: the 
Church of St Vasilije Ostroski Miracle-Worker, the monastery, the belfry, and an open-
air chapel for liturgies. Everything in them is brand new and very opulent. The church 
crosses are gold and their glitter can be seen from a distance. Everything is richly 
decorated with representations of all Serb saints and kings, and there is also a silver 
icon of the Holy Virgin. Brocade, gold and silver abound, and the frescoes are in bright 
and Renaissance colours. The chapel for liturgies is decorated with frescoes of Serb 
saints, who alternate with Serb peasants in traditional costumes; Christ is portrayed on 
the dome. Venetian blue prevails. Everything in the monastery refectory is new and 
opulent: cabinets, tables and chairs of solid dark wood. 
                                                 
2 We failed to establish the exact number of Bijeljina’s population, because according to some respondents it has now 
grown to 100,000, of which 90% are Serbs and 10% are Bosniaks. 
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The church belfry rises several metres above the high minaret of the restored mosque 
nearby. “Could the belfry really be higher than the minaret or is this simply an optical 
illusion,” we asked a 26-year-old hieromonk in the monastery. Smiling with evident 
satisfaction, the young man confirmed that the belfry really is higher: “So that the 
sound of the bells will carry at a great distance. Besides, the churches in town are six 
while the mosques are only five,” he said, stressing the importance of numerical 
superiority too. 
A respondent whom we approached outside the headquarters of the Islamic community 
in Bijeljina explained that it was important for the local Muslims to restore and 
preserve the mosques in their original style and size. It is entirely obvious that this is far 
from the truth. We viewed the ongoing reconstruction of a mosque in the centre of 
Bijeljina that was destroyed in the war. It is surrounded by high walls that do not allow 
outsiders to peep at the courtyard. The domes and minarets are obviously different from 
what they must have been before the war. We guessed that upon completion the 
minaret might be a metre or two higher than the latest belfry. In this rivalry he who 
builds last has the advantage. 
The architects of the religious buildings in the Brcko district must have had a rather 
peculiar imagination. There we saw the most futuristic church, whose cubist shapes and 
belfry piercing the clouds would depress even the most pious laic. The size of the walls 
of the giant new mosque under construction in the centre of Brcko is even more 
staggering. Thick walls of several rows of layers of bricks are built over high 
ferroconcrete foundations. The walls and foundations are more than a metre and a half 
thick. Our team unanimously concluded that the mosque was also designed to serve as 
an impregnable fortress. Its minaret is truly unique: constructed entirely of fibre-glass, 
it is reminiscent of a space station, especially with the huge glass crescent that crowns 
it. 
The architectural battle fought through the number and height of places of worship is 
under way in smaller population centres too, such as Zenica – which has seven or eight 
mosques, because 80% of the population are Muslims, and four churches, one 
Orthodox and three Catholic ones – Maglaj or Doboj. 
In the town of Kakanj there is a new large mosque, which is not open to the public yet. 
The worshippers gather in municipal rooms at the foot of the new mosque, which have 
been adjusted to serve as a masjid until the mosque opens. The giant domes are plated 
with shining white metal, and a huge crest of the same glittering metal stands on one of 
the domes rather than at the top of the minaret. All this tops the massive concrete 
structure of the mosque itself, which looks rather like a giant whitewashed bunker. 
The small town of Gradacac, which has a well-preserved fortress, starts with a mosque, 
followed by two churches and then another mosque. In the square around the 
successive mosque there is a marble monument to those killed in the war; their names 
are listed on the monument which looks like a cross between a bower and a turbeh. 
Monuments to those killed in the war are also an invariable feature of the landscape 
around mosques. 
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In sum, there is total architectural kitsch and chaos – we were unable to identify any 
schools, aesthetic considerations, traditions or attempts at harmony with the 
surroundings. The purpose is clear: huge places of worship that can hold many people, 
a massive structure that can serve as a shelter should the need arise, and external 
domination designed to inspire awe among those who profess the foreign faith. 
 
State of Post-Dayton Society in the Two Entities and the Brcko District 
 
Under the Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been partitioned into 
two entities and one district with a special status: the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Republika Srpska, and the District of Brcko. The Federation is divided 
into ten cantons. At the same time, Bosnia and Herzegovina functions as an 
international protectorate and all decisions taken by the two entities as well as by the 
cantons must be approved by the Office of the High Representative. As one of our 
respondents, a professor of sociology and law, put it: “In Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
process of exercising sovereign statehood is very difficult. It cannot be sovereign 
because it functions as a semi-colonial state. The international factor operates like a 
colonial master who makes all decisions concerning politics, the economy, and all other 
spheres of life. On the other hand, the division into entities does not allow basic 
mechanisms of the state to function on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Railway transport is not functioning normally yet, nor is the rest of the economy. The 
absence of a fundamental decision on the state level, namely on the future status of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, is tangible.”3 
“The tripartite presidency and the way it functions shows global dysfunctionality; the 
majority of decisions on significant political issues cannot be made by a single round of 
voting only. Even if just a single member of the presidency is against the 
implementation of an important reform in a given entity, no concrete action to solve the 
problem can be taken. People in both the Federation and Republika Srpska are 
struggling to survive, they are resigned to their fate, and do not reflect on the question 
of reconciliation.”4 
The majority of respondents shared the professor’s opinion. On the one hand, they 
admitted that the signing of the Dayton accords had ended the war and prevented 
further genocide, but on the other all felt strongly that Dayton had legitimized the 
ethnic cleansing conducted during the war and had later given the green light to what 
would be the “finishing touches” to the massive population shifts. 
Most of our respondents felt nostalgia for “the lost harmonious and unified fatherland” 
and dreamed of Bosnia in future as a unified multiethnic state divided into cantons. In 
January 2004 the NGO European Stability Initiative advanced the idea of abolishing 
the two entities and transforming Bosnia into a three-layered federal state with central, 
                                                 
3 Balkanite +, No. 24, February 2002, p. 15. For details on the administrative and political structure of Bosnia after 
Dayton, see Bosnia: A Case Apart, ed. A. Zhelyazkova, IMIR, Sofia, 2001. 
4 Ibid., p. 16. 
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regional, and municipal government, and 12 autonomous units: the ten cantons of the 
current Federation, Republika Srpska, and the District of Brcko. For the time being, this 
plan has been rejected by the Serbs from Republika Srpska. They categorically refuse 
to give up their present autonomous status. They are afraid that they will have a 
subordinate status within a unitary state. They do not see political integration with 
Sarajevo as a solution to the problem. If they cannot achieve unification with Belgrade 
they would prefer to strengthen their autonomy and entity. 
For ordinary people the dream of a unified Bosnia naturally evolves into Tito-nostalgia. 
Two Serbs and one Bosniak from Kakanj aged 45 to 47, whom we interviewed, 
admitted having portraits of Tito at home: “In Tito’s time life was real, now we have 
democracy which means looting.” 
We asked a respondent who is a scholar whether the reunification of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was possible. His answer: “For ideological and political reasons this 
reunification is unacceptable to the Serbs. But there are countless problems even in the 
Federation, where Croats and Muslims are united in some way and have common 
bodies of local government – the Croats frequently complain that they are in a second-
class position. In none of the entities are there any signs of processes that might lay the 
beginning of reunification. Let’s take, for example, the sphere of education: in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina today there are three systems – a Croat, a Bosniak, and a Serb one – 
which means three histories, even three mathematics, three literatures, and so on. There 
is division and alienation in absolutely all spheres of life. Although in an intellectual 
and moral sense political and economic reunification would mean a lot and is a 
wonderful prospect, in all likelihood it would remain only an idea, a beautiful dream.”5 
The war has resulted in massive displacement of the population aimed primarily at 
ethnic homogenization. In purely human terms, this is not something that everyone can 
endure. We met people who have chosen to return to their home towns or villages 
despite the fear, despite the deaf and silent hatred that surrounds them. They have 
returned home and are trying to live normally, but they actually live in fear and under 
permanent stress. 
In Visoko we spoke with a Muslim artist and a retired Serb actor. The Muslim opened 
up only after the Serb left: “I lost everything in the war. In August 1994 the town was 
besieged by Serb tanks and guns on the hills. They shelled us, and my sister died not 
because she was hit but of fear. I couldn’t bury her in the daytime because we were 
constantly under fire. We organized her funeral in the night by torchlight. I had a Serb 
neighbour who regularly told me when there would be an attack and in which direction 
so that we could survive. I have forgiven everything because it’s up to God, not up to 
me, to judge. But not everyone can forgive.” 
The Serb and the Muslim, an actor and an artist, are interesting to portray. Both were 
artistic, intellectual people and maintained an impeccable relationship between one 
another – of mutual respect for their talent. At the same time, when they were together 
                                                 
5 Ibid., p. 16. 
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they categorically refused to discuss the war and constantly tried to turn the 
conversation to the history of Visoko. They were proud of the town’s old history and 
were obviously ashamed and blamed each other for its recent history, so they preferred 
to avoid the subject. Each told us about the war only in the other’s absence. They were 
a real-life case study in tolerant hostility. 
Before the war the Serbs were 12% and the Croats around 3% of Visoko’s population. 
Today the majority of the population are Muslim Bosniaks, the Serbs have decreased to 
2%, and the Croats are probably less than 0.5%. 
The best known on the Balkans Catholic Franciscan classical lyceum (high school) is in 
Visoko. The school building is newly painted and beautiful. The garden is well-tended, 
clean and lovely, and there is perfect order everywhere – everything is green, and tall 
pine-trees are in perfect harmony with blossoming magnolias and well-kept flowerbeds. 
This is like an oasis of beauty and order that has escaped the ravages of war. The nun 
on duty was strict and reserved, but she invited us to wait in the lobby for one of the 
Franciscan teachers, Friar S., who told us about the history of the school: The high 
school of the Franciscan Order was founded in 1882 for all of Bosnia and initially 
functioned for one year in Kresevo and then for 17 years in Travnik. The school 
building in Visoko was built in 1900 and initially served to train only future monks of 
the Franciscan Order. Between the two world wars the school started admitting not 
only Catholics but also students from other ethnic and religious communities – Jews, 
Serbs, Muslims, virtually everybody. It had students from Slovenia, Serbia, Albania, 
and elsewhere. The student population exceeded 500, of which 200 were trained for 
Franciscan monks. After World War II the rules became stricter and the school no 
longer admitted secular students but only candidates for monks. Those rules are still in 
force. The school admits only children who pledge to serve the Order and is generally 
open to applicants from other Balkan countries too – Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Croatia. 
At present only 70 children are training for monks at the school. According to Friar S., 
that is because during the war most of the families with children emigrated to Croatia. 
During the war the school was evacuated to Croatia, where about 130 students 
continued their studies for four years. “There were Serb troops, they fired constantly 
and we were afraid to keep the children here, so we moved from 1992 to 1996.” After 
the war part of the children stayed with their parents in Croatia, while the school and 
half its students returned to Visoko. Asked how Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats got on 
together in Visoko at present, Friar S. gave us the now familiar answer: “The relations 
are civilized [he had in mind tolerant intolerance]. Perhaps that’s because very few 
have been left, the Orthodox and the Catholics are barely more than 2 or 3%. 
Everyone’s Muslim.” 
The truth is that wherever people from a particular religion or ethnic community have 
ventured to return to their home town or village among the compact communities of the 
Others, there is a tacit agreement that they will ignore each other and avoid contacts as 
much as possible. If the population centre has a river, it should preferably divide the 
two religious communities, with the bridge or bridges crossed only when that is 
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necessary to keep the local economy functioning. This is a sort of tacit, specific local 
apartheid. 
 
The Economy 
 
We discussed the state of the economy with an MP from the Social Democratic Party: 
“Foreign investments in Bosnia and Herzegovina have dropped by almost 120% in the 
last two years. This is a dramatic decline. It’s entirely obvious to everybody that 
nationalism cannot be the guiding ideology because it’s not something from which one 
can make a living. Unemployment has risen. The low economic indicators are due to 
the fact that there are no strong institutions or political stability, and there are social 
tensions because of the slow pace of reforms. In general, all this is a result of 
nationalist government. It seems to me that the High representatives and observers of 
the EU cannot realize that this, precisely, is the root of all evil. Of course, corruption 
and crime are a big problem in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but they aren’t the main one. 
They are a consequence of nationalism, which creates political instability and 
encourages criminal structures. If we want the State to survive, we must eliminate all 
kinds of radicalism and fundamentalism, whatever nation or religion they might come 
from.”6 
Many of the local factories are closed or operate with reduced capacity and outdated 
equipment and production techniques. The big metallurgical plant near Zenica, which 
employed 35,000 workers before the war, now has jobs for 4,000, of which only half 
are filled. Investments are declining every year, and there is stagnation in production 
and consumption. This process is largely associated with the significantly reduced 
trafficking in goods and profits from it, which constitute the bulk of local investments. 
EU donor grants are likewise decreasing because of the disappointment with the 
country’s slow progress and because of the new geopolitical priorities. 
The standard of living is within the usual range in this region. The average monthly 
wage is 250 to 300 KM (Convertible Marcs), and the monthly pensions vary between 
70 and 500 KM. The unemployment level is defined as very high. Different sources 
confirm that it is around 50%. A significant part of the jobless people are actually 
employed in the grey economy. 
We spoke precisely about unemployment with several young bearded Muslims near the 
new mosque in Kakanj. They smiled calmly and told us politely: “We aren’t concerned 
about unemployment. It’s unpleasant, true, but it’s not up to us to be concerned, Allah 
knows best and when He decides there will be jobs for us.” This attitude differs from 
the anxiety of the middle and older generation of men. They are concerned about 
unemployment, they are pessimistic and certainly do not rely on Allah to take care of 
their employment and families. Here we must note the generational difference in 
                                                 
6 The latest elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which were held several months after our field study, were again won by 
the now traditional nationalist parties. 
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perceptions of the objective economic and political situation, which are due foremost to 
the different degree of religiosity. 
Everyone tries to dodge taxes, but this applies especially to the big businessmen who 
acquired their capital during the war. The majority of people, irrespective of their 
national and religious identity, bitterly hate the war profiteers: “They behave like local 
feudal lords and ignore the laws. While we were dying on the fronts and our families 
were being wiped out they were marauding, and they are now multiplying the fortunes 
which they’ve made from our blood and suffering.” 
It is obvious to us that some old hatreds have subsided, but that new tensions and 
reasons for hostility have appeared during and especially after the war. 
In the last few years Bosnia has become a major trade centre on the Balkans. Because 
of its weak administrative control and porous borders, the country is a preferred 
destination of cheap goods from the Middle and Far East, which are then easily shipped 
on to neighbour countries. The huge Arizona Market, which is midway between Tuzla 
and Brcko, is emblematic in this respect. It sprung up entirely illegally in the Brcko 
district which, as a “no man’s land,” was in a state of total anarchy. In the years after 
the war this town-sized market was legendary for the entire Balkan underground world 
– here one could buy everything from white goods, hi-fi equipment and stolen cars to 
women, weapons and drugs. That is when it grew to the size of a town. Today great 
efforts have been made to legitimize and place Arizona under the control of the local 
authorities, although it is not clear how effective those efforts have actually been. 
Arizona has changed visibly thanks to the construction of new modern market halls and 
specialized shops. Either way, this market provides a livelihood for almost half of the 
population of the Brcko district, irrespective of ethnic identity. 
 
Villages Versus Towns 
 
In addition to the ethnic shifts, our team observed the social impact of the intensive 
processes of rural-to-urban migration. As a result, the towns are going through a period 
of unprecedented growth and large-scale construction. Construction is also under way 
in the villages, but those who have returned to live there are fewer and often more than 
half of the houses are empty. This new urbanistic boom generated by the uncontrollable 
migration of rural populations to the towns usually causes distress to the indigenous 
urban population. Many of the respondents who are indigenous urban residents 
qualified it as a peasant invasion, and there are factors that can lead to tensions 
between the local residents and the new settlers. 
Here is what a respondent told us when we expressed surprise that brand new houses in 
the villages, obviously built with EU funds, were locked up and empty: “It’s not 
enough to have only a new house or roof over your head. People feel insecure, they sell 
their new houses and look for a new homeland or a new place to settle down because in 
the place to which they have returned and where they have a new house they feel 
insecure and cannot satisfy their religious, educational, administrative or other needs. 
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In most cases people settle in the entity or population centre that is closest to their 
national and religious identity so that they can feel secure.” 
Even during our field study in 1998, a professor of literature who was a refugee from 
Sarajevo to Pale described the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a war of villages 
against towns. Back then she told us the story of her family, noting that during World 
War II, just as during the recent war, there was a tendency for peasants to oust old 
urban families and move into their homes. This is what she told us about herself: “ I left 
my home in Sarajevo with nothing but a small bag of toiletries. I can never return there. 
I’ve learned that a large Muslim family from the nearby villages has moved into my 
home. I cannot bear the sight of shepherds eating with my grandmother’s silver cutlery 
food placed on the piano… I’ve already been through this once as a child, when 
peasant Ustase threw us out of our home in Mostar where we were one of the oldest 
families. We started building a new home for ourselves in Sarajevo precisely with this 
silver cutlery that belonged to my grandmother – that was the only thing we took when 
we fled Mostar. Now I am starting from scratch in Pale for the third time. I’m too tired 
to go back.” 
Our present respondent likewise claimed the following: “The whole war was against 
the towns and the urban population. That’s how it started, whatever military historians 
might claim now – the peasants attacked the towns. The tendency towards urban 
migration has continued after the war too. This naturally leads to disproportion. The 
towns are developing, their population is growing, they start prospering, while the 
villages remain undeveloped. This divide will grow because the towns will continue 
developing while the villages will deteriorate increasingly. At present there is a hidden 
conflict between towns and villages, but it might deteriorate into a new aggression if 
the circumstances for that are appropriate.” 
The urban population in Sarajevo experienced such an urbanistic cataclysm in the 
1980s too. In connection with the 1984 Winter Olympics new housing developments 
were built in the capital city, and after the Games tens of thousands of families from the 
villages were housed in them. In this way, Sarajevo’s population increased by one fifth 
in just several years. The scale of the present urban migration and concentration in the 
towns of large alien social groups surpasses even the memories of the Olympics. 
In this connection, a young Muslim respondent who fought in the “Green-Beret” units 
that defended Sarajevo delivered a furious tirade: “In Sarajevo there are new people 
from Sandzak, from Eastern Bosnia – Foca, Gorazde, Visegrad, Zvornik. They are said 
to be Muslim refugees. But they are Muslim on paper only, if they have to they go to 
the mosque in order to show themselves as Muslims. The people who come to Sarajevo 
are usually people who have lots of money. There are no institutions to ask them how 
they made their money. They take part in privatization, they open shops and 
restaurants. Meanwhile, you feel like an endangered species – you know nothing, you 
can’t understand what’s going on. We submit to those who have money. In my native 
Sarajevo the indigenous Sarajevans have withdrawn into their shells .” 
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There is a similar atmosphere of disharmony in the Serb town of Pale. Before the war 
Pale was a mountain resort village near Sarajevo with a population of 3,500, and of 
12,000 in the municipality. At present the population is 35,000. There are no visible 
conflicts between the Serb indigenous residents and newcomers, but as one of the 
respondents noted, “The local residents are vastly outnumbered by the new settlers and 
no one’s pleased or happy about that.” 
This statement was amazingly accurate, because Pale is a new town with the gloomiest 
and most unfriendly people we have ever seen. No one smiled, no one showed any 
curiosity or desire to talk with the newcomers, everybody looked at us with suspicion 
and coldness. This is a town of refugees from almost the entire territory of Bosnia, the 
majority from Sarajevo, who are convinced that everybody is treating precisely them 
unjustly. Even our seasoned team, which has travelled to all kinds of places for years, 
found it difficult to make friends in this town despite the fact that it was full of young 
people and children. The only people who talked and laughed were those who got 
drunk in pubs. As a respondent who is a police officer put it, “Pale is a boiling pot.” 
The pessimistic attitudes of Pale’s residents are also partly justified by the fact that they 
are often a target of SFOR and police operations aimed at tracking down Radovan 
Karadzic as a war criminal. In a successive operation designed to find Karadzic, on the 
night of March 31/April 1 SFOR troops invaded the home of the local priest. There was 
no trace of Karadzic, but in the course of the operation the priest and his son were 
wounded badly and had to be flown by helicopter to the military hospital in Belgrade. 
A Serb who has returned to his home town of Kakanj, which now belongs to the 
Muslims, told us the following: “After the war I was housed in a small village in 
Republika Srpska, where I lived in full comfort – I had a pension as a war invalid, a 
new house, security, respect. But I couldn’t settle down – I’m used to life in the big city 
and, besides, my native house is here. I was driven by nostalgia and returned home. 
Now I live in abject poverty, in fear and without a job, but I want to live in the town 
and to be on my own territory.” 
Incidentally, this concentration of people in towns is not entirely unreasonable because 
it offers better chances for a normal life. In the small population centres it is almost 
impossible to find a job or to provide an education for your children if you are from 
another nationality, because there is complete ethnic segregation in the education 
system. To quote a Serb respondent, “It’s as if we are in the 19th century – we live in 
ethnic segregation. You go back to your native town or village, your house is restored 
and nice, but how will you make a living if you are a minority, where and by what 
curricula will your children study? That’s why, for example, the number of Croats and 
Bosniaks who have returned to Banja Luka is catastrophically small.” 
 
Weapons 
 
There are large amounts of unlicensed weapons among the civilian population in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and this remains a problem for the country. SFOR has 
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reported a number of cases in which whole arsenals have been found in the most 
unexpected places. There are also shocking cases in which, for example, a family was 
found to have kept a tank in its farmyard or, as a respondent told us, a huge howitzer 
was found in a hayloft. 
Respondents who are military officers told us about a case in which Dutch troops from 
SFOR were sent to search a remote house in a distant hamlet where an elderly father 
and son lived in virtual isolation. In the basement of the house they found an arsenal of 
80 weapons of all sorts. The two elderly men, who were visibly very upset, confessed 
that they were stockpiling the weapons for self-defence because they feared for their 
lives. When the commanding officer ordered the confiscation of the weapons and the 
troops started loading them on trucks, the two men burst into tears and the father broke 
down. They begged the troops to take them along too in order to protect them or to 
leave them some weapons for self-defence. Their terror and depression were so genuine 
that the officer decided to let them keep one of the shotguns for self-defence. 
A policewoman told us a similar case about a mother and her son, who wept when an 
impressive amount of weapons were confiscated from their home. This is what the son 
told the troops: “My father was killed before my very eyes when the war broke out… 
Please let me keep the weapons or kill me because I can’t do without weapons…” 
Several months before our field study, SFOR conducted several operations in which 
they seized surface-to-air missiles too. Military officers told us about various 
operations in which they had confiscated 180 small arms, 50,000 cartridges, or other 
kinds of heavier weapons. 
Our respondents from the local communities were reluctant to answer questions about 
weapons, but all admitted that they did not doubt they would start fighting again if the 
international peacekeeping force withdrew, so they needed to be armed in order to 
avoid being caught by surprise as in 1992. 
The military and international police officers were tolerant when we discussed this 
phenomenon of anxious stockpiling of weapons. When we pointed out that in all 
likelihood if SFOR withdrew another fratricidal war would break out, a colonel from 
SFOR reacted in defence of the local people: “Just think how those people feel after 
everything they’ve been through. At least two generations must pass before the wounds 
of the past can heal. They can’t do without weapons. Weapons are a kind of security 
guarantee for every person in this country. If something happens tomorrow, they won’t 
be caught by surprise once again. They are still very emotional – every single family 
has lost someone in the war.” Question from us: “The bitterest conclusion from what 
we have seen both in Kosovo and here – and this is apparently confirmed also by what 
we now have in Afghanistan and Iraq – is that it seems that your peacekeeping missions 
must last forever?” The colonel: “No. They must last until people come to terms with 
the past, until the entire nation, virtually everybody, will have a personal stake in 
avoiding conflict, in living and prospering in peace.” We interrupted him: “So this 
means two generations?” Answer: “Two generations. Until they feel they have security 
and realize that this security depends on their behaviour…” 
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Our conclusion is that the majority of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina are still 
suffering from postwar depression. In 1998 the symptoms of postwar depression were 
obvious: in the course of our interviews, the respondents told us their stories and wept 
constantly irrespective of their gender, age, ethnicity or religion. In 2004 this 
depression has been apparently overcome and suppressed, but it nevertheless exists. 
Fears, hatreds, memories, grief for the dead, nostalgia for the lost native places and 
homes, shattered dreams, insecurity, disappointment, pessimism are continuing to haunt 
everybody we spoke with during our field study. They no longer weep and keep up an 
appearance of normal behaviour in everyday life. On the surface, they are preoccupied 
with everyday concerns such as housing, donors, the crop, wages, prices or their 
children’s education. Below the surface, however, there is deep gloom, pessimism, and 
hopelessness which are not displayed to strangers. Their consciousness is apocalyptic 
like a print by Dürer. For example, during our interview a Bosnian professor suddenly 
leapt from the table, sat at the piano and started playing beautifully but too loudly. His 
embarrassed wife explained: “We spent months in the shelter, when we were under fire 
he would play the piano to drown the blast of the exploding shells, he simply couldn’t 
bear the sound.” He must probably still hear the explosions. 
The Bulgarian military and police contingent have felt and understood perfectly the 
state of the Bosnian population, because they are not performing their mission formally 
only but have an intimate knowledge of the Bosnian mentality and language. 
Our conclusion is that the majority of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina feel a need of 
and possess weapons. 
The SFOR operations designed to confiscate weapons are of course obligatory, but they 
are doomed to remain futile because people will inevitably continue procuring 
weapons. As regards the question of weapons and the prospects of the international 
presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we recommend heeding the words of our two 
respondents, the colonel and the policewoman from Bulgaria: they need us – two 
generations. 
Another problem resulting from the legacy of war are the landmines planted across the 
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When he heard us enthusing about the country’s 
lovely landscape and lush vegetation, a respondent who is a military officer sobered us 
sardonically: “You can rest assured that Bosnia will increasingly become an 
environmental haven. The country will be overgrown with ever more luxuriant, pristine 
vegetation. Because no one’s crazy to take, for example, their family on a picnic in the 
mountains at the weekend. They would hardly survive amidst the landmines.” Another 
respondent added: “For at least another one hundred years there will be zones in Bosnia 
where no human has set foot, and they will thus remain the only environmentally clean 
place in Europe.” 
Experts think that because of the complexity of the task and insufficient funding, it is 
practically impossible to clear Bosnia and Herzegovina’s entire territory of landmines. 
Different kinds of landmines were planted on the country’s territory, some of which are 
impossible to deactivate. There are signs warning of the danger of landmines in many 
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places, but people have now also become used to taking particular paths which they 
know are safe and sending their children to school along them. To date, nine years after 
the end of the war, just 10 to 15% of the landmines have been cleared. 
The logic behind the specialized analytical centre’s decisions on precisely which areas 
are to be cleared and when is not entirely clear. The centre is probably applying some 
kind of economic logic, but what you actually see in Bosnia looks rather unpleasant: 
tiny fields cleared of landmines and obviously thickly surrounded by landmines, 
reached by way of particular marked or unmarked paths. In this way large areas of rich 
arable land remain inaccessible to farmers. The same also applies to timber in the 
forests. As regards construction, as we mentioned earlier new houses are never built 
over the foundations of old ones. 
It is too early for a possible withdrawal of international military experts and police 
advisors from Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
As regards the European police mission, its mandate is limited to observing and 
advising the local police. The UN mission also certifies all local police officers. Our 
observations and interviews with local people and international police officers suggest 
that all this is insufficient and that there should have been a smoother period of 
transition and transformation of these law enforcement activities. Because the majority 
of people in Bosnia are afraid of going to the local police station and reporting a crime 
or complaining of human rights abuse. To say nothing of doing that in writing and 
openly declaring their name. Especially in cases involving war criminals, and arms, 
drug, and people trafficking. The only effective form of reporting such cases are the 
nationwide anonymous phones established across the country’s territory some time ago. 
Either way, people prefer to report their problems and complaints to representatives of 
the UN missions, who are not empowered to investigate and provide direct assistance. 
 
Islam 
 
Islam in Bosnia and Herzegovina is naturally similar to its Balkan version and has basic 
specific features that distinguish it from the form of Islam professed in the Arab world. 
As everywhere on the Balkans, Muslims in Bosnia have cohabited with Christians and 
Jews for centuries, and in most historical periods they have lived together in peace and 
harmony. The Muslims, as the other religious denominations, did not practice their 
religion actively before the war. They celebrated the major Muslim festivals of Kurban 
Bairam and Ramazan Bairam. They did not abstain from alcohol, but did not eat pork. 
This fact is sometimes explained not by strict observance of the religious rules but, 
rather, with the mountainous landscape of Bosnia and the shortage of feed grain, which 
accounts for the small number of pigs kept in the country. 
According to a Croat respondent, Bosnian Islam has European characteristics and is 
accustomed to tolerance towards the others. As a result of the war, however, radical 
Islam – which is not typical of the Balkans in general – has now appeared in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
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A respondent who is a Muslim religious leader explained that the tolerance of Bosnian 
Muslims is due, among other things, to the Bogomil legacy: “The Bogomils had the 
custom of gathering together and worshipping God openly and outdoors, on the hills or 
what we call dovi, dovišta. In June, July and August the Muslims in Bosnia, on the 
territory of which there are many dovišta, go to those places near Olovo, Kljuc, 
Lastavica, Zenica, and elsewhere. We Muslims regards these dovišta as our sacred 
places. And there’s something else too – we are very rational and for us faith is 
everyday life, we adjust our faith to the particular time and place, and we also adjust 
the particular place and time to our beliefs. Muslims all over the world believe in the 
doctrine of monotheism, and this is something which they have in common with 
Christians too. The doctrine in both Saudi Arabia and Bosnia is the same. We likewise 
bow, but because we are in Europe we cannot accept the ethics of hegemony of a single 
culture only – not only for the Muslims but also for the Christians and the Jews. All 
churches, mosques and synagogues face East because the Orient means the place where 
the sun rises. Our orientation is towards the East, and the West is the place where the 
sun sets. There’s a difference between me the Bosanec7 and the Saudi, and this 
difference is that I have Bosnian experience of Islam whereas he has Saudi experience 
of Islam. We have a specific feature – we have lived among Orthodox Christians and 
Catholics for centuries and they have influenced our way of thinking in some form, just 
as we have influenced theirs; we interact.” 
We asked him whether non-traditional strands of Islam had appeared in Bosnia and if 
they were influential. Answer: “In Bosnia and Herzegovina there are no Muslim sects 
that are significant enough to deserve our attention. There are individual cases of 
followers of the Ahmadiyah, just as there are individual cases of Muslims who accept 
the teaching of the Wahhabiyah. There are also small communities of dervishes, but by 
tradition there are no Bektashi. These are small groups and they cannot change that 
which is the traditional Islam of the Bosanci.” 
Question: “What do you think about Huntington’s thesis of the clash of civilizations?” 
Answer: “I think that the idea is ill-intentioned. Civilizations don’t clash but 
complement each other. If you have two civilizations and there is a clash between 
them, one of them definitely isn’t a civilization. There can be a clash between freedom 
and non-freedom, between civilization and barbarism, but not between civilizations. 
“Muhammad was a reformer. He came and abolished the institution of the clergy. Until 
then clerics had the status of kings, people even believed they were extraterrestrial. 
Muhammad was a reformer because he abolished this mediation between God and 
people, because he reformed the attitude to the faith. Muhammad abolished racism – he 
told the Arabs that there couldn’t be superiority of Arabs over non-Arabs or of whites 
                                                 
7 We learned from this religious leader as well as from quite a few respondents from Sarajevo that the Muslims in Bosnia 
do not wish to be called Bosniaks – because this sounds pejorative to them, something like a common person, a peasant – 
but officially wished to be called and to call themselves Bosanci (sing. Bosanec). These new claims to the ethnic 
designation are not yet popular in the provincial towns and cities. A respondent from Sarajevo told us the following: 
“When they call me a Bosniak and not a Bosanec, it’s as if they are spitting in my face.” This is a new development 
compared with 1998. 
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over blacks. Today’s Muslims don’t need a reform of the doctrine. What they need as 
modernization is a reform of the organization. The Muslims aren’t organized in a 
structure that is adequate to the present age and, because of the lack of adequate 
organization, they make big mistakes in the world.” 
A respondent from Sarajevo, who insisted that we call him Bosanec and who is a native 
citizen of Sarajevo, answered a series of questions which we asked him in connection 
with the radicalization of Islam: “Foreign mercenaries took part in the war. The policy 
pursued aimed at attracting funds from Arab donors, from the sheikhs. In 1993 the 
Mujahideen came to my combat unit. There were translators, people who had studied 
Arabic in Cairo. I claim that we here in Bosnia are the purest Islam. We Bosnian 
Muslims are pure Muslims. And having a long-bearded Arab coming and telling us 
what kind of trousers we must wear is something which I can’t accept. They told us that 
we mustn’t wear trousers but something like robes. Our trousers were longer and 
covered the ankles, which was supposed to be a haram (sin). The ankles had to show,” 
our respondent noted sarcastically. “In my opinion, when you come to us you must 
comply with our culture and our customs.” 
We asked him about the length and shape of beards, because since Sandzak we were 
becoming something like experts on the subject. Answer: “According to Islam, the 
beard must be fine. I don’t want my beard to look like a goat’s. We like short, not long 
beards. When they saw that this wouldn’t work here in Sarajevo, the Mujahideen 
moved to other combat units – among the rural population, who were starving. They 
starting giving them humanitarian aid, but only to those peasants who accepted their 
customs. The peasants gradually became their followers because they were hungry. 
They were Wahhabi, whereas we are Sunni. Here in Sarajevo besides the Arab 
missionaries there were a couple or two from Afghanistan and Pakistan, but when they 
saw that it wouldn’t work they went to the countryside. As regards the beards of young 
men in Sandzak, this isn’t our influence, they are doing it as a form of resistance 
against the Serbs.” 
Our final conclusions are that in Bosnia and Herzegovina there is a strong 
radicalization of Islam among the young generation. These are young people who were 
children during the war. They are now aged between 15 and 25, and they do not know 
the liberal, eclectic version of Islam in Bosnia that is also characteristic of the entire 
Balkans. Nor do they know relations of tolerance and goodneighbourliness between 
ethnic and religious communities. These are precisely the young people whom we saw 
during our whole trip: young people who spent their days around mosques or serviced 
religious bookshops, who were not concerned about unemployment because it is up to 
Allah to find them a job. One evening in Sarajevo we peeped inside one of the old 
mosques in the centre of the city and were stunned by what we saw: many boys aged 15 
or 16 were kneeling and praying. It were as if the nearby high school had come to the 
mosque en masse. And this was at a time of day when their peers would usually head 
for the disco or for a walk in the main street to take a look at the girls. 
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The other change is the declining influence of the Sufi orders of the Mevlevi 
(Mawlawi) and Naqshbandi, which are traditional in Bosnia but have now almost 
disappeared. Yet precisely the Sufi are the Muslims who are most tolerant towards the 
other religions, who profess peace and understanding, and do not turn Islamic 
prescriptions and rules into a compulsory and fanatic dogma. What has happened in 
Bosnia is something which we have also observed among the Albanians in Kosovo and 
Macedonia: marginalization of the Sufi Bektashi and an attempt to oust them to the 
periphery of the Muslim community, perhaps because of their supra-national, supra-
confessional, and pacifist philosophy. In fact, Islam spread on the Balkans in the 15th-
18th century largely through those particular orders. In Bosnia there is a definite move 
towards some kind of stricter and non-traditional norms of pure Sunnism and, in any 
case, towards a visible departure from the strand of Islam that is traditional on the 
Balkans. 
Since the end of the war the countries from the Near and Middle East and Indonesia 
have launched an ambitious programme for revival of the Bosnian religious legacy. 
This is manifested not only in the construction of new mosques and reconstruction of 
destroyed ones, but also in the effort to impose their own methods of purifying Bosnian 
Islam, which is considered to be deviant. For the Muslim countries it remains 
incomprehensible how Islam in Bosnia could possibly have so few bans and so much 
understanding and borrowing from other religions. Even during but especially after the 
war, more than 300 religious humanitarian organizations gradually moved into and 
started operating in the country in an attempt to bring Bosnian Muslims into line. A 
young Bosniak woman told us how during the war they would be stopped in the street 
and offered money in exchange for going to particular mosques. According to a 
Catholic priest, after the war the young girls in Koranic schools were paid 100 euro a 
month in exchange for wearing full head and body covering. 
Young radicals, such as those from the Organization of Islamic Youth, inculcate in 
believers the idea of a future Islamic Bosnia and Herzegovina. Many religious 
periodicals have been launched, and near the mosques one can commonly see 
specialized Islamic bookshops staffed by youths aged around 16 to 20. In the smaller 
population centres children and young people gather around the bookseller, discussing, 
explaining, preaching and, generally, feeling like a circle of the initiated. 
In Maglaj (a town with a 10,000 population, 95% Muslim), while we were arguing 
precisely about beards and headscarves with a young man with a Mujahideen beard in 
the square around the mosque, we saw a conspicuous elderly man in an elegant old-
fashioned suit and fez coming our way. It turned out that he was a deputy of the imam 
and a barber who performs the responsible function of circumciser. In terms of their 
appearance and philosophy, the two men personified the generational division of the 
Muslims in Bosnia. The elderly man with the fez demonstrated his staunch 
commitment to the Ottoman tradition and to the specific Bosnian Islam, complaining to 
us that the young were exercising inadmissible – considering his age and status – 
pressure over him to grow a beard: “I don’t want a beard, it’s silly. Back in the past the 
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followers of Muhammad in Mecca grew beards so that they could recognize each other 
and be different from the rest. Beards are entirely untypical of the Bosnian Muslim 
tradition.” Unlike the elderly man, who was friendly and readily answered our 
questions, the bearded young men were suspicious and tried to make us leave because it 
was time for the Friday noon prayer and we should not distract the believers. One of the 
bearded young men was a student of Islamic theology at the university and told us upon 
departure: “ We want to live according to the Shariah so that we can go to heaven. 
Islam is the supreme religion, all other religions are inferior, they are lower than Islam. 
True Muslims follow the laws of Allah.” He urged our team to convert to Islam so that 
we could step on the right way, because Islam is against drugs, against prostitution, 
against dishonesty. 
 
A Brief Account of the Lives of Three Classmates from Kakanj 
 
The town of Kakanj has a population of around 45,000, and that of the municipality is 
around 70,000. Kakanj is located in the Zenica-Doboj canton. Following the ethnic 
shifts after the war, the town’s population now consists of 50% Muslims, around 30% 
Croats, 10% Serbs, and 10% Roma. Before the war the majority were Serbs, but in the 
post-Dayton population exchanges the Serbs went to Doboj and the Bosniaks to 
Kakanj. They agreed to exchange their houses when possible. Or to buy/sell each 
other’s houses. 
The three men are sitting in the centre of the town opposite a large apartment building 
currently under construction. They are sitting on a plank propped by crates, and leaning 
against the wall of a house. They aren’t drinking anything – they have no money for 
coffee or beer. Probably that is why they aren’t in a café. They are chain-smoking. Two 
Serbs and one Bosniak, all of them aged 47. They are former classmates. The Bosniak 
and one of the Serbs had shared a desk in class for years. The other Serb, who had sat 
on the last desk in the second row, is now sitting on a separate crate. Although they are 
young, all three have very bad teeth – they lost them as a result of malnutrition during 
the war. 
All three feel as if they are bewitched – they are so used to one another that they can be 
together again despite the war, despite the hatred and the fact that they fought on 
opposite sides. It turns out (after we become friends they admit it) that they are sitting 
like dropouts in the street because they cannot go together to a café – everyone must 
know his place; there is segregation. People disapprove of their friendship. But they 
cannot live without each other. The Serb who shared the desk with the Bosniak justifies 
himself to us: “We’ve been together since we were children, I’m used to discussing 
everything with H. I know that he’s Muslim but I can’t confide in anybody else. We 
could barely wait for the war to end so that we could be together again. That’s how he 
feels too.” They glance at each other with the sort of mocking affection that marks a 
true male bond. 
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During our conversation they keep nudging and interrupting each other, arguing and 
disputing – this is entirely natural, considering that one is Serb and the other Bosniak, 
and that they fired at each other during the war. They are deeply ashamed of this and 
are trying somehow to forgive each other. They are doing it awkwardly and clumsily. 
At the same time, they answer our questions almost simultaneously and almost 
identically – they think and feel the same way about all issues, be they political, 
economic or historical. It is obvious that they have been together for years and have 
formed their views together. 
The third ex-classmate, the other Serb, is silent and sullen. He doesn’t join in or 
interrupt them, and all he does is snort occasionally. They are somehow aloof from him 
too. We eventually understand that he fought with passion and belief – he killed many 
people and was himself wounded heavily twice. He has been recognized as a hero in 
Republika Srpska. He would be lynched in Kakanj, but his ex-classmates have not 
given him away as someone who did his best during the war even though they despise 
him for it. The other two fought because they were forced to in order to survive, and it 
is easier for them to restore their friendship. He was driven by nostalgia to leave 
Republika Srpska, where he received an invalidity pension and benefits as a war hero 
and had regular medical care, to return to his home town and friends, where he lives in 
external and internal hell. His life is hell because he lives in fear, because he is in pain 
from his wounds but cannot get medical care, because he is poor and jobless, because 
he hates the Muslims to death but lives in a town that used to be his but is now theirs. 
One of his arms is crippled but the pain is in his stomach, where he was wounded 
badly. He has no medicines, we give him some of our painkillers, he gobbles them 
down in handfuls without water. He doesn’t beg or ask us for anything. Not even for 
our medicines, which obviously relieve him. He is proud and embittered. In his opinion 
none of them should blame Izetbegovic, Karadzic and Tudjman for the war: “America 
is to blame, because in the last 50 years they have been fighting abroad in order to 
avoid fighting in their own country. They have been fighting abroad since the Second 
World War. The Muslims are their disgrace. Just see what they are doing.” 
The Bosniak: “Before the war there Catholic and Orthodox Bosanci in Bosnia. After 
the war they told us, we are now Croats and Serbs. For our part, we were Muslims but 
we suddenly became Bosniaks. We didn’t have enough problems as different religions 
so someone decided to divide us into different nations.” 
The two who shared a desk claim unanimously that “the good life was in Tito’s time, 
and also that the war is the product of three people – Izetbegovic, Karadzic and 
Tudjman. That’s why it’s amazing that they have continued ruling the country for eight 
years now. The SDS [Serb Democratic Party] was in power, now it’s the SDA [the 
Bosniak Party for Democratic Action] or the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Union], and 
they merely change places. They take turns to loot the state treasury. On the whole, 
democracy means looting because there are no jobs and the enterprises are looted one 
by one – here only a few jobs have been left in the mine, in the thermoelectric power 
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plant and in the cement factory, half of which has been privatized. It’s not clear how 
long even those jobs will be available.” 
Question: “Don’t you argue with one another about who’s worth voting for when there 
are elections? New parties were also created several years ago – for example, the 
Liberal Social Democratic Party – which offered an alternative uniting all nationalities 
on the basis of a common anti-nationalist platform. They failed because none of you 
voted for such liberal parties.” The Bosniak answers as follows: “We don’t argue and 
we don’t speak, we even go to the polling stations together and then in the dark booth 
everyone votes for his representative.” His friend adds: “We are all afraid that if we 
elect an alternative party and our side falls from power they might start a new war. It’s 
better to let them make fortunes in power rather than to start killing each other again.” 
All three suggest that we stop talking for some time in order to observe the work in 
progress on the large apartment building across the road. We watch in silence, while 
they spit and don’t even swear but virtually snarl in hatred. We become afraid and ask 
them, “So what’s all that about?” They answer together, interrupting each other: “These 
are the marauders, here are the bloodsuckers, take a good look at them… They looted, 
plundered and became millionaires during the war. They profiteered from everything – 
they sold weapons to the Serbs and the Croats to kill us. Or vice versa… Fuel, foods, 
property… they sold our blood… we were dying from starvation and thirst, while they 
are now laundering money to make even greater fortunes – they’ll sell the big and nice 
apartments in this new building to their own kind again, because they were likewise 
war profiteers and can afford to buy them. It’s a vicious circle. They are Muslims but I 
hate them just as much [says the Bosniak]… one day they’ll pay for it dearly…” 
We leave abruptly because we couldn’t possibly have a happy or optimistic end to our 
conversation. Not this time. 
 
In Lieu of a Conclusion: The Dangers in Bosnia 
 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina we established something very important that undermines 
the normal civic thinking of society: the lack of confidence in the multiparty system. A 
lack of interest in political life. A lack of confidence in and utility of creating new 
parties and different political platforms. 
Our respondents in Bosnia and Herzegovina did not show any interest in discussing and 
arguing about political life and political parties. The overemotional politicization that is 
familiar in all postcommunist countries and new democracies is absent in Bosnia. Our 
all too familiar postcommunist division of society and confrontation depending on 
people’s partisan sympathies and antipathies are absent in that country. 
The three former classmates’ listless comments on their participation in elections were 
extracted only because we were very insistent, but their answers betrayed their total 
indifference to the subject. Our other respondents found it pointless to answer such 
questions at all, and demonstrated boredom. 
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The absence of particular indicators in field studies in conflict or post-conflict regions 
is something like a bad medical diagnosis. People in Bosnia are totally demotivated 
politically. Even the otherwise active people who make some sort of attempts to create 
alternative parties and to test themselves in election races are passive too. This is 
probably due to the post-Dayton introduction of the tripartite model, which is assumed 
to be inevitable because of the protectorate. Perhaps that is precisely why the whole 
energy of society is channelled towards the construction of churches and mosques, and 
towards a sort of religious rivalry. 
 
People in Bosnia and Herzegovina are suffering from acute postwar stress, which is 
difficult to identify because it is suppressed but which generates various internal 
phobias, sociopathies and fears that are intensified by life in a state without a clear 
political and administrative status. A possible withdrawal of the international military 
and police contingents might unlock part of those depressive fixations, and society in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, irrespective of national or religious identity, might head in an 
unknown and unpredictable direction. People are preparing for that. 
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